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This paper tackles the problem of the demarcation of value judgments in
economic expertise. Is it possible to disentangle values from facts, or neutral
scientific assertions from value-laden judgments, in the context of economic
expertise? If not, why not? And if it is, under what conditions? First, draw-
ing on concepts from analytic philosophy, the paper highlights the inter-
dependencies between descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive judgments.
Second, drawing notably on social studies of science, the paper proposes a
definition of ‘expertise’, and translates this into a list of successive stages
wherein these different types of judgments are involved. A backward anal-
ysis of these stages is provided in order to identify where values stand, and
who holds them. Third, reconsidering the positions of neutrality in eco-
nomics (Mongin 2006), the paper defends the ‘weak non-neutrality’ view
in the context of expertise, and concludes with reflections on what could be
done to address the problem of democratic legitimacy raised by the difficulty
of demarcation.
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1 Introduction
There is lively interest in the role of value judgments in economics, as well as
the connected issue of the democratic justification of the power of experts.1 Even
when they do not question the probity or foundations of expert advice, people of-
ten believe that democracy is endangered by the power of experts. This happens
especially where people feel that decisions on important social issues are being
taken not by those who will be directly affected, but rather by experts deciding on
their behalf. It is worrying, therefore, to think that experts may be framing their
decisions not only by reference to their expert knowledge but also through their
own beliefs, values and interests, and that these may be overriding the values of
the wider population. An easy way to foreclose debate on this subject would be
to ignore the anger of the laymen, to accuse them of ignorance and irrationality,
and perhaps even to develop educational programs to convince them to trust the
experts (something which we can perhaps see in initiatives to promote the ‘so-
cial understanding of science’). Such approaches are predicated on neglecting
the role of values in public decisions. Consideration of values, however, is cen-
tral in most public matters pertaining to economics, and hence in the application
of public economic expertise: it is difficult to believe that no value-loaded judg-
ments are ever implied by recommendations concerning economic policy. An im-
portant issue for democracy thus concerns the possibility of disentangling value
judgments from neutral assertions within the context of economic expertise, so
as to identify the origin of value judgments in expert recommendations, and to
be able to distinguish the actual role played by experts from the role played by
politicians – in so far as the latter are considered the legitimate representatives of
the people. This is not straightforward, and it shall be referred to henceforth as
the “demarcation problem.” Taking the demarcation problem seriously is another
1As an illustration, Amartya Sen recently claimed that: “Several features of policy making are
worrying, particularly in Europe. The first is a democratic failure. An economic policy has to be
ultimately something that people understand, appreciate and support. That’s what democracy is all
about. The old idea of “no taxation without representation” is not there in Europe at the moment”
(Storbeck and Hess 2012). See also Martimort (2012).
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way of tackling public concerns regarding the legitimacy of experts on matters
of public economics. Such an analysis, and thus the elaboration of a framework
within which to conduct that analysis, constitute necessary steps towards trans-
parency in pursuit of healthy public debate and the improvement of economic
methods. We are here dealing with methodological and epistemological issues
concerning the integration of value judgments into economics in general, and into
public economic expertise in particular. This raises a number of crucial questions,
which fall into three broad categories. The first category concerns economists
and value judgments: Why should economists care about value judgments? Why
should economists work with value judgments? Should economists make value
judgments or not? The second category concerns the nature and origin of value
judgments themselves: Are value judgments ideological objects which should be
ruled out of scientific discourse? Or is there any way in which they may be incor-
porated into the set of scientific assertions? And where do such value judgments
come from? (Or: where should they come from?) From politics, or economics?
And can we disentangle the value judgment from the overall judgment regarding
a situation? The final set concerns the nature of expertise: What is economic ex-
pertise? What is distinctive about the judgment made by an expert in economics
as compared with an assertion of economic science in general? Can we apply
the discussions on neutrality in economics generally to scrutinize the demarcation
problem in economic expertise?
Even without taking into consideration the relevant literature in epistemol-
ogy or philosophy of science, there are numerous papers within economics itself
which discuss the role and status of value judgments (Arrow 1951, Little 1952,
Buchanan 1959, Klappholz 1964, Blaug 1980[1995], Heath 1994, among others).
This appears to be an area of study in which strong assertions are loudly and
passionately made. Many economists think their business should strictly concern
mathematical models or factual judgments, and that any problem which calls for
value judgments must be excluded from the realm of economic science (see in
particular Robbins 1932). Kenneth Boulding (1969) even declared: “saying that
economics is a moral science is a contradiction.” Some have defended the op-
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posite thesis: on this view, it is part of the specific character of economics, and
of social sciences in general, to be permeated with value judgments. Some have
even considered economics not only to be a moral science, but a mere expres-
sion of ideology (Myrdal 1954). And some have asserted that value judgments
are merely facts like any other (Ng 1972), or that, because the value judgments
typically made in welfare economics are uncontroversial, they may thus be con-
sidered on a par with any positive assertion (Archibald 1959, Hennipman 1976).
Some have conducted contextual analyses of the importance of value judgment
in the contributions of various authors (e.g. Balisciano and Medema 1999, Davis
2005, Cherrier 2009, Andrews 2010), or textual analyses of the influence of value
judgments in allegedly neutral textbooks (e.g. Hill and Myatt 2010). Conversely,
and regrettably, fewer papers conduct minute methodological analyses aimed at
tracing the role of value judgments in economics (Mongin 2006); and, to my
knowledge, no such paper has been concerned specifically with the case of exper-
tise.
The knowledge used by economic experts is of course drawn from economic
science; but the specific nature of ‘experts’, compared with those who other-
wise happen to partake of economic knowledge, is that experts have to apply this
knowledge in recommending a practical course of action, in response to an offi-
cial demand.2 To clarify the specific character of expertise, the definition we use
throughout this paper shall be set by reference to the four following conditions
(Encinas de Munagorri and Leclerc 2009). First, that there exists a procedure
which is decision-oriented and based on some scientific knowledge. Second, that
expertise constitutes the subject of an explicit request, and hence supposes the ex-
istence of a separate “client,” such that anybody who is not appointed by a client
through a formal and legal procedure may not be properly considered an expert.
The client may need expertise to frame a more robust decision (e.g. the members
of government) or position (e.g. the members of the formal opposition).3 Third,
2I here favor the legal definition of expertise, consistent with the meaning attributed to the
word in social studies of science, rather than the layman’s meaning which refers to any specific
knowledge, competence, or experience.
3For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we shall refer to both cases as a “decision,” considering
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that even though the expert is presumed to possess the knowledge or experience
necessary to be able to help the decision maker, knowledge may not be an essen-
tial criterion for defining an expert. Fourth (and as a implicit consequence of the
third condition), that expertise is called upon for a specific case in a specific con-
text. By contrast, for instance, a court which needed to clarify a general question
of scientific knowledge may need to call not an expert but an amicus curiae. All
expertise should therefore be seen as concerning applying general knowledge to
specific contexts.
On the basis of a definition of expertise as strictly based on these four con-
ditions, I claim that the decision process may be seen as containing three stages,
occurring successively. The first stage is the scientific stage where economic sci-
ence is produced. Second stage is the expertise stage, which includes several
sub-stages and involves specific procedures. It supposes, as we said above, a
request from a “client” who, unlike the “expert,” stands outside the domain of
science. The expert then selects the economic knowledge to answer the question
which she is hired to address. She applies her knowledge in formulating the an-
swer. The expert is therefore responsible for preparing the decision, which comes
at the last stage. Decision makers (e.g. politicians) use information drawn from
economic expertise in order to frame their decisions. From this description of the
decision process, expertise appears to be the operational center of the prescriptive
role played by economists. They are the ones who convey economic science to
the decision maker.
Speaking in general terms, we may say that experts’ recommendations imply
values as well as scientific and factual knowledge. The decision process as a whole
involves different kinds of judgments: descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive, the
properties of which shall be scrutinized carefully in this paper. It is standardly
believed that the scientific stage is concerned with descriptive judgments, that the
phases of the expertise stage are characterized by prescriptive judgments, and that
the client is responsible for deciding which values should be at stake, as well
that selecting what position to hold (e.g. as an Opposition party or a trade union) is in itself a
decision.
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as realizing the actual decision. In a simple dichotomy model, value judgments
hence arise from clients only, and are taken as ingredients by the experts. This
paper intends to show that this model is undermined by deeper analyses of the
nature of judgments and of the decision process.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I define the different prop-
erties of distinct judgments, highlight their interdependency, and characterize the
specific nature of value judgments. In section 3, focusing on expertise and pre-
scriptive judgments, I conduct a backward analysis of the stages of the decision
process in order to identify where values come into play, and who eventually
holds them. In so doing, I aim to set up an analytical framework which may be
useful to other studies concerned with the demarcation between value and factual
judgments, and which, at the same time, will also be able to show where such
judgments cannot be disentangled. In section 4, reconsidering the positions of
neutrality in economics (Mongin 2006), I defend the “weak non-neutrality” view
in the context of expertise. I consider what could be done to contribute to the
issue of democratic legitimacy raised by the difficulty of demarcation. Section 5
concludes.
2 Properties of distinct judgments
I here develop some arguments imported from analytic philosophy. Within eco-
nomics, and particularly within economic expertise, there are three different types
of judgments. First, descriptive judgments which correspond to statements of
fact, or “is” propositions. “Sirah is a vine, so is Chardonnay,” for instance, is a
descriptive judgment. Second, evaluative judgments which correspond to state-
ments of value. The “is” here is thus qualified. “Sirah makes good wine” or
“Sirah makes red wine” are instances of evaluative judgments. Third, prescriptive
judgments which correspond to statements of either recommendation or obliga-
tion. For instance, “Paul should drink Sirah, not Chardonnay” is a prescriptive
judgment. This trichotomy seems clear, and the separation between the three dif-
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ferent classes of judgments is clear cut. Let us therefore consider the three types
of judgment in turn, with the aim of shaking this first impression, and highlighting
rather their interdependency.
(1) Let us begin by casting doubt on the assertion that a description is a mere
statement of fact. Consider the following three statements:
i) Paul is choosing Sirah whereas he could also have some Chardonnay.
ii) Paul says he likes Sirah better than Chardonnay.
iii) Paul is choosing Sirah, and notices that Chardonnay is less expensive.
As these three descriptions of a possibly similar situation illustrate, each descrip-
tive assertion requires a selection among all possible descriptions of reality, rather
than mere observation (Sen 1980). However, we cannot say that each of these
selections a priori involves an appeal to values – as the ideology view would
maintain (see below, section 4). At most we may speak of specific interpretations,
where the selection depends on the aim of the description. Such interpretations
may lead us to pursue certain specific paths of judgment, but this influence is not
properly or strictly based on the descriptive judgments themselves. Rather, the
evaluation presupposes the selection of a specific description.
(2) Let us now consider the properties of evaluative judgments. An evaluative
notion of quality (such as “right,” “good,” “balanced”) supposes certain axiologi-
cal abstract judgments. For instance, the definition of the “good,” “right,” or “just”
relies on a specific ethical theory; but evaluative judgments are not all of an eth-
ical nature, nor are they only of an ethical nature. Following Williams (1985),
we may distinguish between “thin” and “thick” predicates. Thin predicates are
strictly evaluative, such as “It is not good (right) to drink wine” or “Sirah is a
good wine.” Thick predicates are both descriptive and evaluative, such as: “Sirah
wines have a balance of integrated, firm tannins and bright acidity with a soft,
spicy and lingering finish.” Thick predicates include descriptions that go beyond
the simple function of providing evaluations; thin predicates do not. Applications
of thin predicates do not make sense without also providing either a description or
citing an experience. Expertise does indeed suppose the application of an abstract
statement to a particular case – this is the fourth condition for defining expertise
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(see above). Hence, experts will use thick predicates in their statements.
How does this argument regarding predicates apply to judgments? I here
present the notion of “basicness” as introduced by Sen (1967), and then discuss
whether evaluations are basic or non-basic. Sen (1967: 50) defines a value judg-
ment as “basic” to a person if no conceivable revision of factual assumptions can
make him revise the judgment. If such revisions can take place, the judgment is
“non-basic” in his value system. Judgments are considered basic until the con-
verse is proved. If evaluations were to be considered basic, it would follow that
no expertise was needed in order to move from that evaluation to advocating a
specific course of action, since no statements of fact or specific attention to the
actual situation would be involved in their formulation. It therefore follows that
evaluations are non-basic in such case, since, if they were, we could imagine that
a computer programmed with an exhaustive list of all the facts and theoretical
knowledge (or an amicus curiae, as we said previously) would also be able to
answer any such question; but this seems implausible. If they are non-basic, then
the request for an expert does make sense, in that she would have to base her
conclusions on a prudent judgment. Apart from cases involving strictly abstract
predicates, evaluation thus requires that we make descriptive judgments of some
kind.
(3) The class of prescriptive judgments is a priori the most important one for
describing the judgments of experts, as these are the ones the client is expecting
him to formulate. Let us consider their properties: namely, their imperative status,
their descriptive content, and their evaluative content.
(3a) Their imperative status is standardly what distinguishes prescriptive judg-
ments from other descriptive and evaluative judgments: they contain some au-
thoritative call for action, or at least some element which orientates action in a
certain way. But the link from prescription to action is not absolutely direct and
unquestionable, as we shall now see. Consider the following examples of such
judgments:
iv) “As Paul prefers Sirah to Chardonnay, he should drink the former rather the
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latter”;
v) “Paul ought to drink Sirah”;
vi) “Paul, do not drink Chardonnay!”
vii) “Do not drink!”
viii) “No drinking”
These examples belong to different categories of prescriptive judgment. By spec-
ifying the context and conditions under which the prescription holds, assertion iv
corresponds to some conditional advocacy in favour of certain actions. Such pre-
scriptions correspond to recommendations; they cannot be called imperative – or,
at most, we can refer to them as hypothetical and non-compulsive imperatives,
implying that the person formulating the prescription would not consider the im-
perative to have been disobeyed if Paul acted contrary to it. Conversely, assertion
vi is an uncontroversial statement of obligation, incorporating an imperative judg-
ment. It may accurately be called imperative, in that the person formulating such
a prescription does hope it will be respected. Assertion v corresponds to an ought
statement. It is underspecified, and may belong to one or the other class, depend-
ing on the context. Assertions vii and viii correspond to a universal imperative,
whether explicitly addressed to one person as in vii, or focused on an implied sit-
uation as in viii. I therefore defend the claim that there are two distinct kinds of
prescriptive judgments: obligations, and recommendations; the former have the
status of imperatives, and the latter of hypothetical imperatives.
As this claim is not standard in the analytic philosophy literature, I shall now
defend it against the counter view that all prescriptive judgments are imperative.4
A first argument in favor of the distinction that I defend may be based on differ-
entiating between the roles we have identified in the description of the chronology
of the decision-making process. Let us consider the competing view which holds
that all prescriptions are imperative by nature. We may note, first, that experts
are not entitled to formulate imperative judgments; if experts were to formulate
4I shall not, however, address all the different views on prescriptive judgments. See Hare
(1952), and notably Hare (1952: 10.3) for further distinctions within the class of prescriptive
judgments.
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prescriptions with imperative status – i.e., to be followed whatever happens –, the
client would be logically committed to follow his recommendations. However,
since the clients are the entitled deciders, experts have no legitimacy to take de-
cisions, nor to determine the decisions that the client makes. The distinction of
roles between expert and client makes such a scenario unlikely to happen; but
to guard against such a confusion of roles, which could arise if we take the im-
perative nature of prescriptions seriously, experts should content themselves with
issuing evaluative judgments. The formulation of prescriptive judgments, strictly
speaking, should proceed from the client, who is the proper decision maker. This
exclusion of prescriptive vocabulary from expert usage corresponds to an ideal
use of the language of morals. However, describing an ideal case is not always
the best way to understand how concepts are applied. We do indeed observe that
prescriptive language is used by experts, and even that they are expected to use
such language. For instance, the French Council for Economic Analysis (Con-
seil d’analyse économique, or CAE) is explicitly asked to formulate one or two
pages of recommendations for certain policies at the end of each of their studies.
CAE specifies meanwhile that “the opinions displayed in CAE surveys belong
only to their authors and do not commit either the Council, nor the delegated pres-
ident, nor, of course, the Prime Minister" (see CAE website). It is assumed that
the expected use of prescriptive vocabulary does not and should not imply any
imperative meaning. The client is the one who decides and who is responsible
for formulating the imperative statement. Conversely, the expert formulates an
opinion which does not need to be followed, and which is referred to as a recom-
mendation.
Another way to present this argument is as follows. If prescriptions presup-
pose an obligation, there ought to be some authority to this obligation which is
able to lead through to an actual decision. Such statements may suppose that Paul
(in cases iv, v and vi) or anybody concerned (in cases vii and viii) shall indeed
have a feeling that they must do as the prescription enjoins, just as if there existed
an evaluative notion of the good (or of the “better”) that was personally accepted
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by the person concerned, and which would make her follow the prescription.5
Individualized obligations are imperative for the person concerned if and only if
there exists a principle of authority that establishes a link between the prescriptive
statement and the actual decision. Conversely, there is no such necessity for the
case of recommendations, since the advisers have no direct authority over actions,
even though they are entitled to formulate recommendations for action.
As well as the argument based on the difference between the roles of advis-
ers and deciders, a second argument for the distinction claim may be proposed,
this one imported from the philosophy of science. This argument focuses on how
experts frame their judgments. An expert formulates his policy recommendation
based on his analysis, which is limited on two grounds. First, the framing which
is imposed by his appeal to the tools and knowledge of economic science places
all other knowledge – inter alia, sociological, political, ethical stakes – as a priori
beyond the scope of his analysis. Second, all scientific statements, and especially
those of social science, are marked by uncertainty: experts may have done their
analysis properly, or they may not. For instance, they may later learn something
which would show that they should have used other tools to complete their anal-
ysis. Similarly, new theories in economic science may be discovered, or relevant
data that were previously unknown or inaccessible may become known and acces-
sible. In all cases, such developments are likely to invalidate aspects of the former
statements, or at least to induce their reconsideration or reformulation. Most se-
rious scientists will withhold full commitment from very substantive empirical
claims as made at any instant t. Meanwhile, and without contradiction, they may
have good reasons to trust such statements on the basis of their current analysis
– honestly made, let’s say, on the basis of sound work, competence, and expe-
rience. All in all, they may have good reasons to have faith in their statements,
conditional on the restrictions imposed by the disciplinary approach to the issue
in question, and upon the limitations of the knowledge they currently have access
to.
5Hare (1952: 167) speaks of a statement of psychological fact.
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We now develop a final argument in favor of the distinction claim. As we
shall set out below, prescriptions entail certain descriptions. In particular, they
imply certain implicit descriptions about what should be done to conform to the
standard that people generally accept: to drink what you prefer in case iv, to
drink what is better for certain reasons in cases v or vi, or not to drink at all in
the contexts implied in cases vii or viii. Paul is supposed to conform to these
expectations just as if there existed an evaluative notion of good or better that is
commonly accepted by people.6 Obligations as applied to groups imply that such
‘sociological facts’ do exist, while a recommendation may simply suppose that
the client holds that such a case is likely to occur, or that it is worth considering
as a reasonable assumption. Concretely, this means that experts may suppose that
their clients are likely to want to act according to certain principles of action that
the recommendation they formulate is supposed to reflect.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between two versions of prescriptive
judgments: obligations, which correspond to imperative prescriptions; and recom-
mendations, which correspond to non-imperative prescriptions, as in the expertise
case.
(3b) Armed with this distinction, let us now scrutinize further statements of
prescriptive judgments which rely on other kinds of judgments. These, we will
see, do indeed contain both descriptive and evaluative parts.
Firstly, as was noticed in case iv, some judgments may make explicit mention
of the descriptive context in which the prescription holds, or they may assume
there exist descriptive contexts under which the prescription holds. Such judg-
ments do indeed depend on certain facts, which entails that changing the facts
could imply changing the judgment. Using Sen’s vocabulary, such prescriptions
are hence non-basic, in the sense that a “change in factual assumptions would en-
tail her changing judgment" (Sen 1967:50sen1967). Some obligations, however,
seem to escape being non-basic: such as the commandment “thou shall not kill,”
which is supposed to hold in any context. These kinds of judgments, however,
6Hare (1952: 167) describes this as a statement of sociological fact.
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belong to the class of universal imperatives, rather than to the hypothetical imper-
atives which are proper to the expert’s recommendations, and with which we are
here concerned.
Besides this, it is controversial to claim that such prescriptions always hold
no matter what. Faced with a moral dilemma, we might need to accept that the
commandment does not hold in specific cases, for instance for self-defense, or in
the choice of killing one fetus out of twins in order that one should survive. In
such cases, a very precise descriptive judgment regarding the situation is essential
in order to justify the prescriptive judgment that must eventually be made.
In the case of recommendations, the descriptive part is by definition supposed
to exist. As we said above with regards the fourth element of expertise, the ex-
pert is called upon only if some factual elements are at stake. For instance, an
expert might suggest letting the government deficit increase during a recession,
while expecting or encouraging a drop in the deficit during periods of growth:
her prescriptions intimately depend on the way in which she perceives the factual
context.
Hence all prescriptions do imply certain descriptive judgments, whether im-
plicit or explicit.
(3c) Secondly, prescriptions imply certain evaluative judgments, even though
these are not always clearly stated. Prescriptions imply some value judgment as to
what is good, better, or acceptable in the precise context of the statement. This el-
ement is necessary in order for a prescription to hold, as Hume’s guillotine entails.
Some would argue that the requirement of the presence of value judgments in pre-
scriptive statements is controversial. Based on a “naturalistic” view of evaluations
– in Hare’s words – or as a possible consequence of the D view elaborated below
(see section 4), ethical or prudential judgments are considered as mere statements
of fact, so that statements implying evaluations may nevertheless not be value-
loaded. The normative–positive distinction fades away under such view, and one
would be tempted to consider evaluations as belonging to a wider class of descrip-
tions. I dispute that this conclusion correctly follows from the naturalistic view:
13
that the scientist uses values as a scientific “ingredient” in his reasoning does not
entail the total disappearance of the evaluative content as to what is good, bet-
ter, acceptable, or prudent in the statements that result. Conversely, such value
judgments, be they ethical or prudential, are necessary for the orientation of the
prescription. Ideally, as we shall confirm below, if the person who formulates the
prescription is not the person who requested it, such value judgments should re-
flect the client’s values rather than the expert’s values. Prescriptions are indeed a
mix of descriptions, evaluations, and authority for action.
In the case of obligations vii or viii, there is an implied evaluative judgment
that it is better not to drink, plus a sociological judgment that this evaluative judg-
ment is a good thing to follow, and a psychological judgment that the prescription
shall be followed. All in all, in the case of obligation, statements of sociological
facts, psychological facts, and normative facts are necessary elements to build an
overall prescriptive judgment. Under the previous example of judging the right-
ness of a public deficit by appeal to automatic stabilizers, the expert supposes that
there exists an outside evaluative statement which says that it is good to use the
state budget for macroeconomic purposes, and that it is good to stabilize economic
conditions. If these premisses did not hold, quite apart from the knowledge of the
theory of automatic stabilizers and of the actual shape of the economy, the expert
would not be able to derive any recommendation, but would have to be content
with mere descriptions. In the case of recommendations, it is necessary to have
some idea of the likelihood that the principles under which the prescription is for-
mulated would be well received by the client, as well as a statement of the value
judgments.
(4) It now is time to summarize the conclusions we have reached so far, and
conclude on the proper way to analyze value demarcation in expertise. Experts’
prescriptions, which I here call recommendations, are not compulsory even where
they comprise recommendations for action deriving from a mix of both descriptive
and evaluative judgments. Description is the ground for neutral scientific work,
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and it contains a fortiori no value judgments.7 Nevertheless, among the scope of
true assertions, the formulation of a descriptive judgment entails the responsibil-
ity of selecting, among all possible descriptions, the relevant one for the actual
objective of this description. This selection task is called for by a distinct type
of judgment – evaluation – which in turn has been selected in order to derive a
prescription. In the case of expertise, these value judgments should be selected to
correspond to the requests of the client to whom the recommendation is addressed.
As prescriptions contain some value judgments, evaluation and, as a consequence,
the primary description, can also be seen to contain them, by a process of reverse
construction.
I have indeed described a decision process in successive stages. If one consid-
ers the construction of the decision from the beginning to the end, neither science
nor description are value-loaded8. Demarcation seems possible at each of the first
stages: the dichotomous model, which simply sets “is” and “ought”, supposes
a clear distinction between descriptive statements and statements implying value
judgments. Yet, values are to be implicated by and incorporated in expertise, i.e. at
the later stages of the decision process. As we have shown until now, these stages
are logically dependent with each other. The fact that the expertise exists and
directs the selection of values, makes the judgments developed at earlier stages
value-loaded. Hence the judgments implied in earlier stage may have a different
status because of later stages. I therefore claim that there is a feedback“retro-
action" of values between stages coming from the later stages to the first ones.
I therefore suggest a move from a simple dichotomic model to another one,
more sophisticated. The simple demarcation model supposes “is” and “ought”
may be separate if you can distinguish descriptions from the rest of the process.
My demarcation model supposes to take into account the interaction of the differ-
ent stages of the process, and, in particular the feedback of the necessity of value
judgments of the later stages to the kind of descriptions and theories we make at
7I do not adopt Myrdal’s “science is ideology” position, as I shall argue in the last section.
8It would be more accurate to say they may be value-loaded under certain views, but this is not
the issue at stake here. This point shall be partly discussed below.
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earlier stages. I now need to describe the decision process and makes an analysis
on the basis of the specific analysis of each step of this process in a reverse order.
This is what I shall do in section 3.
3 Prescriptive judgments and expertise
We now know that descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive judgments depend on
each other. A decision may or may not follow the prescriptive judgments; and the
latter depend in turn on certain evaluative judgments, which themselves depend on
a selection of certain descriptive judgments. As a consequence, if we are to under-
stand where and how values are contained within the prescriptive judgments for-
mulated by experts, an exclusive focus on experts’ prescriptive judgments would
seem to leave significant elements out of the analysis. We have seen previously
that the value judgments used in a prescriptive judgment are logically connected
with the description; we will be able to identify the way in which descriptions
may incorporate value judgments by reconstructing this process in reverse. Value
judgments are indeed ingredients not only of evaluative judgments, but also of
descriptive judgments.
The decision process can be divided into six phases. Within the three broadest
stages sketched in the introduction to this paper – the final decision phase, the ex-
pertise phase, and the primary stage, science – there are six phases to the decision
process, which we may present in chronological order as follows: First comes
(1) the scientific phase. The middle stage, expertise, contains four phases: (2) re-
quest, (3) selection of the model, (4) application to the data, and (5) formulation of
a report, with descriptions, evaluations and prescriptions. The decision phase (6),
which comes last, may include a political process in the case of a public decision.
To take into account this interdependence of the three categories of judgments in
the decision process, I propose to work backwards in order to reconstitute how the
recommendation is arrived at. I therefore set out these six phases in reverse order
and analyze their value-contents.
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The last phase of the decision process concerns the decision, properly speak-
ing (6). The “client,” e.g. the policy maker, uses information provided on the
basis of economic expertise, or perhaps from a plurality of economic experts, to
take his decision. As I noted in the previous section, he may have overriding rea-
sons not to follow the prescription, and consequently may indeed not follow it.
Just as prescriptions come from the expert, so the decisions come from the pol-
icy maker. Because of their distinctive attributes, prescriptions from experts are
not compulsory for the clients. Reasons not to follow the recommendations made
on the basis of expertise may emerge from the decision process itself, or from
the divers persons comprising the client institution. Perhaps the public would not
ratify the proposal whatever the arguments in its favor; or perhaps there are per-
sonal disagreements between certain persons, a lack of confidence in the expert,
etc. The policy maker is the one who will eventually take the decision, and thus,
in the end, is the one who is accountable. But saying that the decision pertains
to the client does not yet entail that it is completely independent of the way the
expert formulates her prescriptive judgment. The expert’s judgments may indeed
influence the client’s decision. True independence would mean that experts would
never influence the client’s decision; but in such a case, the very fact that there had
been a call for expertise appears odd. In the end, the decision is more likely to
follow the recommendations than not; and at the very least, we cannot suppose
that it is completely independent.
Let us now consider the different phases the decision process has to go through
in the expertise stage.
In the final phase of the application of expertise (5), the expert is asked by
the client to formulate a judgment. Here it is important to note that the expert is
constrained to apply a selection from her knowledge to a selection from the rele-
vant data. In so doing, she must make a choice from among a range of different
analytical framings, each of which will conceptualize the situation in a different
way. For instance, there are different models for explaining the links between un-
employment and working time, and these respond differently to different initial
assumptions. In view of the need to select from among the relevant data and ana-
17
lytical frames, the task of formulation of an overall judgment comes to resemble
an “art” of economics in the sense proposed by John Neville Keynes (1891),9 i.e.,
that the discipline decides on rules of practical action or evaluation on the basis
of a profusion of theoretical and empirical economic knowledge. For demarca-
tion to be preserved within the “art” of political economy, we must suppose, first,
that knowledge belongs to the scientist, second that “judgment” or “prudence”
belongs to the politician, and third – and most strongly – that the process of se-
lecting data or models from such a plurality is never subject to any value bias.
But this is unlikely. There is not, and nor could there be, any means of regulating
the cognitive processes whereby we derive judgments from this plural and multi-
faceted foundation such that the potential for bias was excluded. The possibility
of demarcation is therefore doubtful, due to the impossibility of disentangling the
influence of values within the art of political economy.
The application of economic knowledge (4) is also part of the expertise stage.
Here the expert applies selected knowledge to the data in order to formulate the
answer to the client’s request. This means she needs to locate (or generate) the
relevant econometrics to derive the desired conclusions via confronting the data
with the selected knowledge. To measure inequality, for instance, the expert who
has primarily chosen to focus on income rather than other kinds of data, shall also
have to choose certain data and certain normalizations from among the statistics.
In other words, the expert has the responsibility of selecting some kinds of de-
scriptive judgment among the many possible ones in order to frame the eventual
recommendation. In the ideal dichotomy model, the choice of description among
all consistent ones should depend on the client’s aims and nothing else. If the
latter are fuzzy, changing, or insufficiently specified, the expert would most likely
make the selection independently. She would then bear some responsibility for
the value content of the eventual prescription. This is another hindrance to the
demarcation of the role of expertise, which we shall further develop below.
The expert also needs to select the relevant models (or any other kind of
9See below in the presentation of the (B) view.
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knowledge produced by economic science) to answer the request (3). Again, if
the client’s value judgements are sufficiently explicit, the expert will be able to
take them into account and exclude any appeal to frameworks which might be in
conflict with them. If they are non-explicit, or fuzzy, or insufficiently specified,
the expert might need to appeal to her own “imagination,” habits, or inclinations.
In our example of measuring inequality, for instance, an expert may select the
Gini index for incomes among the diverse inequality indices and diverse possible
metrics. This might not be discussed with the client; perhaps it will merely be pre-
sented as a technical or pragmatic choice. Perhaps they will claim that the Gini
index has appealing mathematical properties, or that there are available data sets
for incomes, while these do not exist for standards of living. In the example of
measuring inequality, the answer to the question “Has inequality increased since
x?" may thus be a yes or a no. Nevertheless, there is a diversity of possible analy-
ses, and the expert might be well aware of these. In this specific case, conclusions
would be different according to the choice of the index, the metric, and even the
source of statistics. As Kolm has remarked:
“different measures of inequality give widely different, and even op-
posite, results. Such policy which diminishes some apparently rea-
sonable measure increases other ones; And I can take any country
and prove that in some period (whatever it is) inequality has increased
or decreased in it, or any two countries and prove that inequality
is higher in the one or in the other, by choosing different inequal-
ity measures, all of which would probably seem good and valuable
at first sight. Furthermore, this embarrassing situation happens not
only when we consider the complex social, or socioeconomic, or eco-
nomic position of persons, or even their consumption-labor bundles
over time or even timeless, but even in the simplest case where the
variable is a unique magnitude (and, even a quantity) per person, such
as its income or its wealth.”10
10Kolm (1976a:416).
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The choice of an index, which may be made consciously and for pragmatic rea-
sons, nevertheless implies a selection of certain values and a rejection of others.
As we shall discuss with respect to step (1), further specific analyses of the value
content of such a selection of knowledge may be of interest. In the case of in-
equality measures, this may be done straightforwardly thanks to the existence of
systematic normative analyses of inequality indices. For other domains of eco-
nomics we cannot consider that this may be so easily done on the basis of existing
economic literature – it may not even be possible at all. Among other things, it
would require the existence of an (independent) normative analysis of each of the
models used. In such a case, the difficulty of associating explicit values to each
model constitutes a second hindrance to demarcation.
We have until now supposed that the expert is willing to serve the public objec-
tive. But if her objectives diverge from those of her client, the process of selecting
models or selecting data becomes a strategic tool.11 If the consequences of the
recommendation for the expert run counter to her incentives to make proposals
that are most helpful to the client – e.g. the risk of loss of reputation, or perhaps
of losing opportunities for further consultancies or grants –, the expert may in-
deed have divergent objectives.12 Hence, her selection may serve her own rather
than the client’s values. The difficulty of controlling for the agency problem in
client–expert relations forms a third hindrance to demarcation in expertise.
The application of expertise starts with the request (2), i.e. the appeal to ex-
pertise by an interested client.13 The notion of a “client” is not uncommon in
economics,14 where it is used to describe the person, political authority, policy
maker, etc., who uses economics as a tool.
In the simple dichotomy model, the value judgments should be issued by the
client – meaning that he should formulate them explicitly. In other words, the
11See the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982) on a strategic exercise of expertise.
12See Gromb and Martimort (2007).
13Encinas de Munagorri and Leclerc (2009,2010) develop the definition and the conditions of a
request in the context of expertise.
14See especially Robbins’ contributions, and e.g. Klappholz 1964:108.
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client should be able to furnish the elements of his utility function, i.e, his “ends,”
so that the economist can eventually derive the best “means” to achieve them, or to
answer any of the expert’s questions while respecting the client’s value judgments,
and without intruding with her own. Yet it is controversial whether this may in fact
be done (e.g. when the client is an institution), or, if it can, whether it is possible in
a very extensive range of cases. Returning to the example of measuring inequality,
the question issued by the client would likely be: Has inequality increased or
decreased since we were elected? In all likelihood, the clients would be unable to
specify whether they wish to address the λ or the µ condition of invariance,15 even
though these denote respectively the rightist and the leftist inequality indices.16
Klappholz highlights another reason to be pessimistic as regards the possibility
of the client being able to explicate her ends:
“Ends are not simply given, but are elicited and modified in the course
of the discussion.”17
The difficulty of defining the client’s ends or values constitutes a fourth hindrance
to demarcation in expertise.
Let us now consider the primary, scientific, stage (1). We here speak of eco-
nomic science itself, i.e. the production of abstract, empirical, and experimental
knowledge regarding economic laws, axioms, theorems, models, etc. The study
of the implication of values in scientific production can be conducted either by
considering the role that values play within the produced economic knowledge –
values are an ingredient of economics and considered as such –, or by consider-
ing the role of individual values in the process of production of such economic
knowledge – values have an influence in the way researchers in economics work,
hence on their scientific results. On the one hand, economic science is supposedly
15For the λ condition of invariance, multiplying the income of each individual by a strictly
positive constant does not affect inequalities among them; for the µ condition of invariance, adding




descriptive. Some consider even normative economics to be a positive, scientific
process,18 which deploys specific techniques in order to tackle value judgments
treated as facts. For example, in the process of measuring inequality, the scientific
stage consists in comparing the axiomatic analyses of the Gini, Atkinson-Kolm,
Theil, or other inequality indices. Concretely, by distinguishing which axiom is
respected or violated by each of the indices, we learn, for instance, how inequality-
adverse, or left or right oriented, each one of them may be.19 At this stage, nothing
justifies us in claiming that a researcher working on such abstract analyses should
also hold the values expressed through the axioms. To give a trivial illustration,
the use of an Atkinson index with ε = 0 supposes the user is not inequality ad-
verse, but this obviously does not imply that Anthony Atkinson himself is not
inequality adverse. On the other hand, some carefully study the influence of indi-
vidual values on the production of knowledge. I do not deny that personal values
may influence the choice of the theme or content of the scientific production of
any economist. Indeed, a great deal of evidence speaks in favor of this claim:
this is sometimes explicitly assumed by the scientists themselves, and has also
been documented in many contextual studies. But my claim is that this point is
not relevant for our present inquiry. What is relevant here is to distinguish be-
tween the actual introduction of values (which is our subject), and the intention to
introduce such values in a scientific work (or, conversely, to deliberately exclude
them). Imagine that an economist has certain neutral intentions. They may well be
value-impregnated, even if she is not conscious of this fact. Imagine now that the
researcher has some value-loaded intentions which come into play in the process
of producing scientific results. We must accept that the entirety of her scientific
production does not explicitly result from these personal values, nor can we as-
sert that her personal values are always well translated into the resulting scientific
work. It is rarely easy for a scientist to consider all consequent impacts which
her research may have; even though an analyst may ex post uncover her values
in those impacts. In other words, there is no reason why we should trust that a
18E.g. Fleurbaey (1996); see the (D) view, below.
19See Gajdos (2001), Gajdos and Weymark (2012).
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researcher is actually doing what she thinks or claims she is doing.
Independent analyses might reveal that some of her assertions logically entail
a certain ethical theory which appears to be contrary to the scientist’s explicit in-
tentions. For instance, Baujard (2010) showed that Bentham’s ethical welfarism
implies his prior commitment to fairness over goodness, contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of his utilitarianism. In the case of the specific task of describing values – as
in the case of the axioms of inequality indices –, I would label this production as
neutral. In the other case described above, where the producer may, intentionally
or unintentionally, incorporate values, the value content needs to be uncovered
by further analysis. The value content of what I shall call “the primary scientific
production”, i.e. before it may be scrutinized for values, is undefined. The produc-
tion may thus be labeled value-free in sense (D) (below). Such reflexive analysis
is not easy to produce, in the sense that we cannot count on applying one method
to produce a single paper for each family of models and consider that the value
analysis is now done. A difference in context may indeed modify the normative
analysis.20 Hence it might be necessary to study primary scientific production in
a range of particular cases. There is hence no reason to suppose that the asser-
tions of economic science, qua part of basic science and hence with no specific
purpose and not contextualized, should be generally labelled as either neutral or
non-neutral. To be able to assess the value content of an economic statement, it
must be considered in conjunction with other contributions.
As a consequence, the value content of expertise cannot be identified in just
considering each economic assertion used to derive an expert recommendation,
but requires further information. In order to demarcate the role of expertise, the
expert will need to address three things.First, she must identify the client’s val-
ues. Second, she must provide a primary scientific production, which of course
we cannot consider neutral a priori. Third, she also has to show that she has scru-
tinized this production for traces of values which may be relevant to the specific
context of this expertise. As we can now see, the normative analysis of the pri-
20See notably the analysis of rankings of opportunity sets by Baujard (2007, 2011) with respect
to considering the role of contextual features on the conception of freedom.
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mary scientific production only makes sense via feedback, i.e. because it is used
in a given context in a process of expertise where values are involved. A fifth
hindrance to the demarcation of value judgments in the application of economic
expertise lies in the absence of systematic theoretical analyses of the normative
content of theoretical models (and data) in different possible contexts within the
realm of economic science.
As an interim conclusion, we may say that the presentation in reverse order
of the process of framing scientific knowledge, expert judgments, and decisions,
allows us to see the interdependency between the different stages, and hence to
consider in a more precise manner where value judgments may be involved at each
step. Can we now draw any conclusions as regards the normativity, or conversely
the value neutrality, of expertise?
Against the thesis that recommendations based on economic expertise have a
normative content, I have argued that prescriptions are not compulsory; that the
client’s decision is not dictated by the expert. Conversely, in favor of the thesis of
normativity, respecting the allocation of tasks does not prevent the expert’s values
having substantial influence on the decision. I have described a number of serious
hindrances to the demarcation of value judgments in the application of economic
expertise, such that the client cannot disentangle the values involved in the recom-
mendation which is supposed to inform the final decision. The latter depends on
the expert’s choices, and not just on her scientific knowledge or any non-value-
based choices. Hence the expert is not just a neutral transmitter of knowledge
from the realm of science to reality. She does unquestionably incorporate values
in the process of formulating a prescription, and the resulting decision may be
influenced by these values.
4 Positions on demarcation in economic expertise
This section sets out a categorization of the different positions which may be
adopted with respect to the demarcation of value judgments in the application
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of economics expertise to practical problems. That is, these are theses concerning
the relative scope of neutrality and normativity within the different demarcation
schemas that are available. Mongin (2006) proposed a seminal typology of neu-
trality theses in economics, which is summarized in table 1. Reference to this
original paper shall prove necessary in order to understand what is at stake in this
discussion, but in so far as I consider the particular case of prescriptive judgments
to be recommendations which follow upon the application of expertise, and thus
concern not only the problem of possibility but also that of legitimacy, I shall
here need to modify his presentation. This organization is summarized in table 2.
Cases of correspondences with Mongin’s typology are specified on the right.
Table 1 Typology of neutrality theses, according to Mongin (2006).
Can economists avoid value judgments?
I- According to the strong neutrality thesis, all economics is posi-
tive.
II- According to the weak neutrality thesis, there are inevitably some
value judgments, but they can be made explicit and so contained.
III- According to the strong non-neutrality thesis, value judgments
can never be disentangled from others.
IV- According to the weak non-neutrality thesis, certain value judg-
ment can be disentangled from others, and some cannot be.
(A) The position that there exist both a positive economics and a normative
economics corresponds to the famous dichotomy of normative vs. positive as no-
tably introduced by J. S. Mill. This is based on the same grounds as the common
opposition between ethics and science, is and ought, and facts and values. Hume’s
Guillotine has been called upon to help us understand the scope of the distinc-
tion.21 According to Hume, you cannot deduce an “ought” from exclusively “is”
premises. A normative economics based on value judgments, as well as a clearly
separated positive science of economics, both on this view fall within the purview
21Note though that the textual reference to Hume was incorporated into the standard reference of
economics methodology only lately, after Robbins’ book (Mongin 2008: 3[34]). The retrospective
reconstruction is therefore most likely an anachronism, but it makes sense today to clarify the
distinction at stake.
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Table 2 Typology of areas of economics and positions on neutrality.
Should economists make value judgments; or, can experts legitimately make value
judgments?
Economics’ areas:
A- Both a positive and a normative economics exist; (II)
B- Besides normative and positive economics, a particu-




C- Economics should be neutral; (I)
D- Economics is entirely neutral ; (I)
E- Economics is entirely non-neutral; (III)
F- Economics cannot be entirely neutral. (IV)
of the economist. With respect to the normative part, though, some consider that
value judgments should nevertheless be kept to a minimum. Mongin calls this po-
sition “the containment claim” (as developed in his position II). In general, norma-
tive economics should just be concerned with certain value judgments, standardly
the Pareto criterion, whether interpersonal comparisons of utility are accepted or
not, and equality.22 According to this position, economics proposes different kinds
of scientific analyses: on the one side mainly based on facts (as well as logic and
mathematics), on the other mainly based on values (again, as well as logic and
mathematics). Since the distinction between “is” and “ought” is often called upon
to make this clear, two notions of “ought” should here be distinguished (as we
did above in section 2: 3a). On the one hand, there is an “ought” which just cor-
responds to an evaluative judgment, something which normative economics as a
theoretical device standardly cares about. On the other hand, there is an “ought”
which corresponds to a prescriptive judgment, i.e., a rule of action, which may
be either imperative or not, as are recommendations in the case of expertise. In
the context of expertise, where the problem at stake calls for prescription and not
just evaluation, something more is necessary than simply a normative economics
22Bergson 1938, Samuelson 1947, Little...
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focused on ought as “evaluation.” This is why I now consider a second way of
classifying the areas of economics, one which is more likely to correspond to the
specificity of prescriptions.
(B) On this view, besides normative and positive economics, economics is
also concerned with the “determination of practical rules of action.” Whereas this
position is a subdivision of (II) in Mongin’s (2006) account, drawing out the latter
activity allows us to seriously consider the specificities of prescriptive judgments,
and to tackle the subject of expertise itself. The traditional presentation of political
economy in the late nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth is
based on a trichotomy of normative economics, positive economics, and the art
of political economy. John Neville Keynes’s famous quote is often called upon to
define the latter:
“As regards the scope of political economy [...], does it treat the ac-
tual or the ideal? Is it a positive science concerned exclusively with
the investigation of uniformities, or is it an art having or its object the
determination of practical rules of action? [...] The first belongs to
positive science, the second to normative or regulative science (along
with ethics, if indeed it be not a branch of ethics or of what may be
called applied ethics), and the third not to science at all in the more
modern use of the term, but to art as distinguished therefrom. [...] A
positive science may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge
concerning what is; a normative or regulative science as a body of
systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and
concerned therefore with the ideal as distinguished from the actual; an
art as a system of rules for the attainment of a given end. The object
of a positive science is the establishment of uniformities, of a norma-
tive science the determination of ideals, of an art the formulation of
precepts. [...] ”23
Art is not part of economic science strictly speaking. But this is the subset of
23Keynes, J. N. (1891:20, 22-23, italics in original text)
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political economy which is of interest for the decision-maker. Demarcation is
obviously not easy to maintain within the art of political economy, as we claimed
above.
Now we can develop a typology of positions as regards demarcation.
(C) “Economics should be neutral.” This claim is one of the justifications of
the strong neutrality thesis (I), according to Mongin (2006). This position notably
corresponds to the Weber’s notion of value-neutrality, his Wertfreiheit: normative
assertions belong to politics, not to economics. The rationale of this position is
the following: Values do exist, but as they cannot be proven on scientific grounds,
they lie outside the scope of science. In so far as it remains a science, a special
effort appears necessary to place a border between economics and non-scientific
assertions, including ethical statements. Hence economists qua economists should
not make value judgments. A famous representative of this position is Lionel
Robbins: he focuses on the specific case of interpersonal comparisons of utility
that are, in his mind, obviously not value-free.
“An interpersonal comparison of utility is a comparison which is never
needed in the theory of equilibrium and which is never implied by the
assumptions of that theory. It is a comparison which necessarily falls
outside the scope of any positive science. [...] It involves an element
of conventional valuation. Hence it is essentially normative. It has no
place in pure science.” 24
According to this position, demarcation within science even goes beyond the dis-
tinction between the roles of economists as scientists and the role of citizens – or
their representatives. The latter are decision-makers who may deal with values;
the former deal with facts only. A consideration of the mix of facts and values
belongs to the art of political economy, but not to economic science as such. Rul-
ing any “ought” out of the scope of economics (and interpersonal comparisons
of utility in particular) has a troubling consequence: it definitively excludes the
24Robbins (1932:130)
28
possibility that economic science can develop recommendations. This element is
thus linked to the pessimistic and persisting view – yet controversial – that “wel-
fare economics is dead.”25 Fortunately, considering values to be outside the scope
of science does not prevent prescriptions being made for their own sake: experts’
prescriptions remain viable. Unfortunately, this restriction of economic science
to facts has another troubling consequence: prescriptions are now made without
any scientific precaution nor any special care for value transparency, thus raising
the question of demarcation in the domain of expertise. My claim is therefore that
position (C) amounts to sweeping the demarcation issue under the carpet, but not
resolving it.
(D) “Economics is entirely neutral.” This view corresponds to a second justifi-
cation of the strong neutrality thesis (I), according to Mongin (2006).26 Of course,
values do exist, but they may be considered to be scientific objects, just as prices
or quantities are. Hence scientific assertions may equally well concern values or
facts. This view, well represented by social choice theory or negotiation theory, is
explicitly defended by Fleurbaey:
“The domain of the economic theories of justice, that is tackled by
this textbook, belongs to positive economics, and does not contain
any normative or prescriptive assertion! [...] Positive, in the meaning
we retain here, does not just concern descriptions of phenomena, but
also includes the study of claims and lines of arguments.”27
This position supposes a strong belief in the possibility of demarcation, along with
the following principle: the economist makes value judgments in so far as she her-
self holds the values which are the object of her judgment; but she makes positive
assertions in so far as she considers value judgments that are held by somebody
25Baujard (2011)
26“The naturalistic view,” Hare (1952) refers to may be considered as a subcase of this thesis.
27“Le domaine des théories économiques de la justice, dont traite le présent ouvrage, appartient
à l’économie positive, et ne contient pas d’assertion normative ou prescriptive ! [...] Le positif,
dans l’acception proposée ici, ne concerne pas seulement la description des phénomènes, mais en-
globe également l’étude des arguments et des raisonnements." Fleurbaey (1996:2), my translation
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else. Can we apply this view directly to our aim of assessing the possibility of de-
marcation within expertise? Certainly not: it is strictly concerned with economic
theory or economic science as such, but cannot be extended without further qual-
ification to any applications. Once applied, we are led to question the allocation
of tasks between the decision-maker – who holds the value judgment – and the
expert – who uses it in her framework to answer the question posed by the former.
In this case, we shall need to move to another view of demarcation.
(E) “Economics is entirely non-neutral.” This view corresponds to the strong
non-neutrality thesis (III) in Mongin’s typology. Myrdal’s (1954) position illus-
trates this view.28 In a wider sense, this view is held by neo-Marxists and many
heterodox economists. According to this view, value judgments and judgments of
facts cannot be logically separated. Hence, if not ideology, then values at least
cannot be disentangled from the so-called scientific assertions. Myrdal comments
as follows:
“A disinterested social science has never existed and, for logical rea-
sons, cannot exist. The value connotations of our main concepts rep-
resent our interest in a matter, give direction to our thoughts and sig-
nificance to our inferences. It poses the questions without which there
are no answers. [...] The recognition that our very concepts are value-
loaded implies that they cannot be defined except in terms of political
valuations. It is indeed on account of scientific stringency that these
valuations should be made explicit. They represent value premises
for scientific analysis; contrary to widely held opinions, not only the
practical conclusions from a scientific analysis, but the analysis itself
depends necessarily on value premises."29
As demarcation is impossible according to this view, economics, whether consid-
ered qua science or expertise, is entirely normative. The worst we can do on this
account is to place a veil over value judgments – or to allow such a veil to be
28For a more nuanced account of Myrdal’s position, see Bellet and Barbaroux (2012).
29Myrdal (1958:1)
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placed. Conversely, it becomes encumbent on us to identify the value judgments:
transparency is a deontological requirement of the discipline, which requires us
to organize a “technology” of demarcation at each step of the construction of an
economic assertion.
(F) “Economics cannot be entirely neutral.” This corresponds to the weak
non-neutrality thesis (IV), which is the one defended by Mongin (2006). Certain
value judgments can be disentangled from others, in which case neutrality can be
retained. But this is not always logically possible, in which case economists can
no longer claim to be value neutral. This is also the view I defend for the case of
economic expertise. Let us develop it.
I have shown above that there are various reasons why demarcation is not
always possible. Let us recall them here, though in a different order. Because
of the interdependency of the different stages of the decision process, analyses
of demarcation focused on economic science may be marked by the problem of
demarcation as it occurs in the context of expertise. First, the expert is responsible
for the art of combining models, but there is no framing procedure for this art that
is likely to be able to control demarcation. Second, concrete evaluation entails the
selection of a description: the expert needs to choose some operational meaning
and statistical content in order to formulate the specific evaluation she is expected
to make. If the value in question were different, then her choices would have
to be adapted accordingly. Because evaluations imply values, this selection is
consequently value-loaded. Similarly, the selection of one model or framework
from among the existing ones is also a determining choice, which incorporates
values. Third, even if the explication of values were theoretically possible, it
remains concretely difficult, if not impossible, for the client to list all his given
value criteria. Fourth, it might be difficult to associate an explicit value to each
model, at least because of the importance of context. The absence of systematic
analyses of the normative content of theoretical models in different context does
not help. Fifth, it is not always obvious how to control for the agency problem.
Because of these problems, values incorporated into the decision do not only come
from the client, but may well be influenced by the person working as an expert.
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The four views and associated problems are summarized in table 1. The simple




Explicit Case EE Case IE
Implicit Case EI Case II
dichotomy model, according to which demarcation is possible (as in views (C) or
(D)), supposes we are always in case EE: both the value judgments held by the
client and those held by the expert are unambiguous. Conversely, the strong-
neutrality view (E) not only supposes that experts have implicit values – i.e., that
we are always in cases EI or II, and that it is most likely that we are in case II –, but
also that there is no way through which we can expect to reduce such ambiguity.
View (F), which I here defend, considers that all four cases are likely to happen,
according to the specific situation in question.
The analysis provided above allows us to enumerate some paths which may
help us at least to reduce the scope of the demarcation problem, although perhaps
not to remove it altogether. Let us consider these cases of ambiguity.
When the client fails to state explicit values, the expert could be required to
question him until he makes them explicit. A policy-maker who is used to thinking
or pretending that the statistics speak for themselves will likely not be able to give
a specific account of his values as regards distributive justice when he asks the
expert to measure inequality. By contrast, the expert knows (or, at least, should
know) which values are relevant to chosing among the available economics tools
and statistics. Before accepting the demandrequest, she thus has a responsibility
to ask for an explication of which values are relevant and why, and to require this
to be specified in the contract.
Experts may have implicit values for different reasons. If the ambiguity is in-
tentional, there is a deontological issue at stake that no methodological improve-
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ment within economics itself can resolve; this will turn on matters such as repu-
tation, or a solution to the agency problem which includes the reward system and
the legal responsibility of the person acting as expert. However, ambiguity is not
necessarily intentional, for the expert may simply be unaware that their economics
tools are value-loaded. This may be interpreted as a result of her poor knowledge,
which could thus be compensated for by better education or by the selection of
experts on the basis of their training. But, as we have argued above, the lack of
awareness might come from economic science itself, particularly in the absence
of a reflexive science apt to scrutinize the value content of economic production
in the relevant context. There is therefore a need for more systematic normative
analysis of existing work. Besides, within the art of political economy, there is
not to my knowledge any reliable way to organize the process of the selection
of models, and the process of framing judgements on the basis of such models,
which could allow for the intrusion of value judgments to be controlled. As much
of the value-loaded activity may not be subject to a systematic process of demar-
cation, the selection of the expert who shall incorporate these values constitutes
the primary and determinant value-loaded choice, here taken by the client. In this
respect, certain procedures may be called upon to facilitate this process, e.g. pro-
cedures of selection of experts (Leclerc 2005, Leclerc and de Munagorri 2010)
which describe their values, their educational training, and previous attachments
to certain institutions, which might be an indirect means by which to approximate
the determinants of such a cognitive process.
It is worth specifying that the view (F) purposes to retain the view contained
in (B) of distinctions between areas within economics, rather than the now more
standard view contained in (A). Within (B), positive economics should not be de-
veloped without any consideration of what is at stake in the context of “the art of
political economy.” This is one of things which is at stake in opening up the de-
bate on demarcation. Analysis of demarcation in economics is standardly focused
on economic science; here I have chosen to consider it within the whole process
stretching from production of knowledge up to its use in producing expert advice,
and the eventual decision. It is important to understand why the latter emerges as
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essential for the actual analysis of demarcation in economics. I can accept that
the normative status of some scientific assertions in economics may be undefined.
But, I claim, they do not remain undecided forever: at some point in a decision
process involving economic science values may be identified, and this can then be
seen as bearing implications, via a process of backwards reasoning, for the first
stage of its production. The analysis I have here conducted of the properties of
descriptive, of evaluative, and of prescriptive judgments, as well as the enumer-
ation of the stages of production of knowledge, expertise, and decision, allows
us to understand the irreducible interdependency between the production of eco-
nomic knowledge and of economic expertise. Of course, theorists generally do
not apply their theories themselves; they may not even control the way in which
they are used. Economists who produce value-loaded theories become responsi-
ble for their values when their theories are applied, because that is the moment
when these values become influential – and, even more so, because it is the raison
d’être of their theoretical production that the theories they produce are likely to
be applied. It is therefore not at all clear that theorists are entitled to wash their
hands of value analysis once their theories pass into use within public policy.
5 Conclusion
In the ideal dichotomy model, positive economics is considered to be separate
from normative economics, and demarcation is supposed to be based on a perfect
division of tasks between the client and the expert. This division entails the possi-
bility of clearly distinguishing between “is” and “ought,” or “facts” and “values,”
in every economic assertion, whether these be theoretical or applied claims. The
client provides information on his “values,” and the expert integrates them as an
ingredient in her scientific and otherwise value-neutral reasoning, from which she
will derive a prescriptive judgment.
Yet, as this paper showed, the dichotomy model is unstable, since, at each step
of the framing of the expert’s recommendation, the demarcation between value
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judgments and neutral scientific assertions is not straightforward. In this paper I
conducted a backwards analysis of the process of production of prescriptive judg-
ments in order to show that such judgments imply certain value judgments not
only for sheer logical reasons, but also as a result of the interdependence between
descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive judgments. Since the reasons for this are
summarized in the description of view (F) defended above, I shall not repeat them
here. This paper studied the difficulties of maintaining a strict demarcation of val-
ues in the case of economics expertise. The results of scrutiny raise three broad
conclusions, with which I close. First, these difficulties entail that, in addition
to the distinction between positive and normative economic science, there exists
within political economy a third discipline, the art of diagnosis of the situation
and design of rules for action, which is still to be built. Second, these difficulties
raise a general and serious problem: the issue of legitimacy of decisions based
on an appeal to expertise within a democratic setting. In order to guarantee the
legitimacy of the scientist’s intervention in the realm of prescription, are there
any methodological improvements which could be made within economics which
may help to ensure proper demarcation, or at least transparency? As we reflected
above, this is an intractible problem, notably within the art of political economy.
But the scope of the problem can be reduced if systematic analyses of the value
of economic models in diverse contexts are conducted, and if theoretical atten-
tion is paid to the consequences of the selection of certain data or normalization
techniques. Hence, and finally, the study of the role of economic expertise in the
framing of public policy decisions could have important consequences for the way
economic science may develop.
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